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RUSSELL M. HABBESHAW, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
NETA CAROL HABBESHAW, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
'Case No. 
10356 
This appeal is taken from the property settle-
ment and alimony provisions of a divorce decree. 
The husband sought a divorce in this action after 28 
years of marriage and his wife counterclaimed. Dur-
ing the course of the marriage, the parties jointly 
acquired real estate, commercial restaurant busi-
nesses, and at the time of this action, there was in-
volved fifteen parcels d real estate, the Auerbach's 
'Tearoom restaurant, and plaintiff's other business 
interests which were unknown to defendant. 
The appellant contends that she was not aware 
of the true value of the property acquired during her 
2 
marriage and that it was not until after the trial court 
entered its decree that she learned the true value or 
the extent of the property involved; that the trial 
court had not been correctly advised as to certaLri 
material aspects of the subject properties, and that 
defendant discovered evidence pertaining to the 
foregoing which she could not with reasonabie 
diligence have discovered and produced at the time 
of trial herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Russell M. Habbeshaw, plaintiff, hereinafter re-
ferred to as plaintiff, and Neta Carol Habbeshaw, de-
fendant and counterclaimant, hereinafter referred 
to as defendant, were married March 29, 1936. This 
was plaintiff's second marriage at the age of 21 and 
defendant's first at age 16 (R. 117). The parties as 
issue have four adult children - all of which are 
m'.:l.rried and reside in their own homes, except for 
the youngest daughter who resides with defendant 
in what was formerly the family home. 
When the parties were first married, defendanl 
was a landlady or caretaker of an apartment house 
for which the parties received free rent (~. 12~~ 
From this humble beginning, and the following "6 
years, they enjoyed financial success permitting 
them to acquire extensive real estate holdings, corr.· 
menced and operated various restaurants, whic~ 
were ultimately sold and the proceeds reinvestec 
into new restaurant ventures (R. 48). 
3 
Neither party brought money or property into 
the marriage, but they each contributed time and 
earnings as their marriage progressed, which per-
mitted the acquisition and the accumulation of real 
estate hereinafter described. 
The real estate acquired, aside from the family 
home, was rental property located in Salt Lake 
County, primarily in locations which permitted the 
future construction of prime rental apartments (See 
Ex. D 8, appraisal of Maxwell S. Loll, real estate 
appraiser). However, each respective parcel of real 
estate, after its initial down payment, was capable ot 
paying itself off, plus taxes and insurance from the 
rents collected. Plaintiff had the final determination 
of selecting tenants, making repairs, etc., while de-
fendant relayed messages to her husband concern-
ing prospective tenants (R. 121). Defendant took an 
active part in the management and operation of 
Carol's Pastry Shop, where for about a year, some 
fifteen years ago, she worked from 4:00 a.m. to 4:00 
p.m. daily, doing usual bakery work. Defendant's 
work at the bakery terminated when she became 
inflicted with a general arthritic condition (R. ll8). 
Her arthritic condition has persisted, and in fact has 
intensified to the point where defendant cannot 
seek or perform independent employment (R. 118, 
119). 
In recent years plaintiff took a tight rein on the 
Parties' business activities, doing as he pleased with-
o~t inimately advising or informing defendant of 
his actions. Defendant managed the parties' house-
4 
hold and reared their children and acquiesced in 
plaintiff's business activities by signing legal docu-
ments when presented to her for her signature with- ' 
out questioning plaintiff's motive or objectives, be-
1 
lieving plaintiff was acting for their best 
interests. Years ago the parties owned two cafes 
located in downtown Salt Lake City, Utah, known as 
Russell's Cafe and Russell's Cafe No. 2 (R. 48). The 
parties sold these cafes, and plaintiff received a sum 
in excess of $47,000.00, which he used to acquire 
the Auerbach's Tearoom in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The proceeds from the sale of the cafes represented 
years of joint hard work and efforts between the 
parties, and defendant believed that she had an 
ownership interest in the Tearoom (R. 48, 49). De-
fendant, as her marriage matured, placed increased 
faith and reliance on her husband's integrity, and 
did not realize until after the trial court had rendered 
its decision, that property values, equities, and lot 
sizes were not fairly represented to the court, nor 
were they known to the defendant until she com· 
menced an independent search (R. 46, 47, 48 and49). 
At the time of the trial the following parcels of 
real estate were under purchase contracts by the 
parties, and the plaintiff testified as to their re-
spective value and indebtedness as follows: 
Located in MonlhlY 
Salt Lake County Value Indebtedness 
payment 
2106 So. 22nd E. $32,500.00 $10,500.00 $186.00 
744 E. 8th So. 13,000.00 850.00 
60.00 
752 E. 8th So. 18,000.00 12,000.00 
100.00 
416-422 E. 5tb So. 40,000.00 21,000.00 
1200.00 
5 
465 E. 5th So. 20,000.00 7,800.00 132.00 
509 E. 8th So. 30,000.00 4,600.00 200.00 
2500 So. 9th E. 13,000.00 5,400.00 57.00 
553-555-557 E. 9th So. 27,500.00 8,600.00 386.00 
561 E. 9th So. 14,000.00 8,000.00 386.00 
567 E. 9th So. 13,500.00 7,800.00 100.00 
575 E. 9th So. 14,000.00 10,000.00 100.00 
866 So. 6th E. 10,000.00 3,400.00 60.00 
849 So. 6th E. 11,000.00 10,200.00 178.00 
851-865 So. 6th E. 30,000.00 19,000.00 345.00 
603 E. 9th So. 17,500.00 10,000.00 132.00 
TOTAL 304,000.00 139,150.00 3,336.00 
(See Exhibit P. 1) 
In addition the parties owned a rental unit 
located at 3400 South 5th East in which defendant re-
leased her interest during the divorce proceed-
ing, so that plaintiff could either sell or borrow 
money to pay a bill due Arden Dairy. Plaintiff ap-
parently discharged a $6,600.00 indebtedness from 
this action (R. 145). 
Plaintiff, unknown to defendant, acquired an in-
terest in Carpenter's Boat Camp located on the 
Strawberry Reservoir, Utah, and in a corporation 
known as Investment Enterprises (R. 138). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS OF APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO RULE 59 (4) U.R.C.P. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE 
DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED 
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DURING THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES BY 
AWARDING PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS AT FAULT 
PROPERTIES WHOSE v ALUES FAR EXCEED 




THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A ; 
NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO RULE 59 (4) U.R.C.P. 
The sneaky demeanor of plaintiff in this action 
should have alerted the trial court to the question-
able valuations placed on the parties' property by 
plaintiff. 
In his complaint for divorce he alleged the 
parties entered into the purchase of three homes .. 
namely: A family residence: a residence located at 
744 East 8th South, and a duplex located at 752 East 
8th South, all in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 2). 
Plaintiff hid from his complaint 12 other parcels 
of real estate (P. Ex. 1) which the parties acquired in 
which there were equities totaling $196,750.00 (Ex. 
D 8). 
Plaintiff entered defendant's default judgment 
unbeknown to defendant (R. 13), and when he was 
confronted with his fraud, fraudulent representa· 
tions, and failure to disclose to the District Court th~ 
truth concerning the property of ~he parties, he vo~ 
untarily permitted defendant to file an answer an 
counterclaim (R. 166; 23). 
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Defendant did not know of the particulars con-
cerning the property and business acquired until 
the time of the trial herein. When asked whether 
plaintiff's testimony omitted or failed (R. 117) to men-
tion anything with respect to the parties' property, 
she answered, "I think it has been pretty well cov-
ered." 
However, counsel for plaintiff sought permis-
sio:::l of the trial judge to file in writing facts and fig-
ures concerning the real property of the parties 
(R. 168). This memorandum was never filed in the 
~ecord, and the time the trial judge considered it, 
it was not clear. In any event, it was before the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision, dated July 2, 1965, 
for Mr. Lund's mailing affidavit certifies a copy to 
Mr. McCullough on ________ June, 1964. 
Plaintiff's brief was highly misleading in the 
following particulars: 
l. Page 2, referring to the 752 East 8th South 
Duplex: 
(a) "Value: $20,000.00." In fact, plaintiff testi-
fied, P. Ex. 1, this property's value was $18,000.00. 
(b) "Note: Home is in name of defendant, con-
ditional payments are current. Great value in prop-
erty as apartment building lot because of lot size, 
300 x 175 x 100." In fact, the lot size has a frontage 
of only 114 feet on 8th South, not 300 feet, and the 
lot is in fact an odd shape, and value as an apart-
ment site is questionable. See Ex. D 8, page 7. 
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2. Page 2, referring to the 509 East 8th Sout~ 
property, stated there was a delinquency of 2 
months, $400.00. In fact, the delinquency was $120~-
00 (R. 47). v. 
3. Page 2, referring to the 2500 South 9th East 
property, reflects no delinquency, when in fact a:i 
arrearage in payments existed in the amount of 
$326.78 (R. 47). All these properties were awardeci 
defendant. 
Defendant had no chance to clarify the above 
misstatements, which in fact were made after the 
trial. The trial court clearly abused its discretion i.'l 
not granting the defendant a new trial, for her affi 
davit clearly demonstrated that substantial material 
evidence would be adduced with a reasonable like-
lihood that it would affect the property division 
determined and that justice between the parties so ! 
required. See Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 . 
P.2d 264; Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P.2d ll55: 1 
Bowers v. Graq, 99 Utah 336, 106 P.2d 765; and Sallas , 
v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE : 
DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED i 
DURING THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES BY ; 
AWARDING PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS AT FAULT,! 
PROPERTIES WHOSE VALUES FAR EXCEEDED: 
THOSE AW ARD ED TO DEFENDANT AND FIXING :, 
ALIMONY. 
d discre- 1 We recognize the trial court has broa d 
tion in determining how the marital property shoul 
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be divided. However, the court should examine the 
factors of each case in light of its peculiar circum-
stances. In McDonald v. McDonald. 120 Utah 573, 236 
P.2d 1066, this court reasserted certain factors which 
r,1iqht be indicative of reaching a fair and just con-
clusion in property settlement matters. The first si:x 
points stated, and as they apply to the instant case, 
are as follows: 
(1) The social position and standard of living 
of each before marriage: Here, plaintiff had no prop-
erty and defendant had no property. Defendant was 
3. landlady and received free rent for the parties. 
Their social status and standard of living were com-
parable. 
(2) The respective ages of the parties: He was 
21 and she was 16. 
(3) What each may have given up for the mar-
riage: Nothing significant is shown in this case. 
(4) What money or property each brought into 
the marriage: Neither brought anything. What was 
gained was through their joint work and efforts. 
(5) The physical and mental health of the 
parties: Both assumed to be good. 
(6) The relative ability, training, and education 
of the parties: Neither had special training or work 
experience. 
The following points control the conditions to 
:Oe appraised at the time of the divorce, namely: 
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(7) The time of duration of the marriage: 28 
years. 
(8) The present income of the parties and the 
property acquired during marriage and owned 
either jointly or by each now: 
Salt Lake County Value Indebtedness PaY111ent Located in Monthly 
2106 So. 22nd E. $32,500.00 $10,500.00 $186.00 
744 E. 8th So. 13,000.00 850.00 60.00 
752 E. 8th So. 18,000.00 12,000.00 100.00 
416-422 E. 5th So. 40,000.00 21,000.00 1200.00 
465 E. 5th So. 20,000.00 7,800.00 132.00 
509 E. 8th So. 30,000.00 4,600.00 200.00 
2500 So. 9th E. 13,000.00 5,400.00 57.00 
553-555-557 E. 9th So. 27,500.00 8,600.00 386.00 
561 E. 9th So. 14,000.00 8,000.00 386.00 
567 E. 9th So. 13,500.00 7,800.00 100.00 
575 E. 9th So. 14,000.00 10,000.00 100.00 I 
866 So. 6th E. 10,000.00 3,400.00 60.00 ' 
849 So. 6th E. 11,000.00 10,200.00 178.00 
851-865 So. 6th E. 30,000.00 19,000.00 345.00 
603 E. 9th So. 17,500.00 10,000.00 132.00 
TOTAL 304,000.00 139,150.00 3,336.00 
Auerbach's Tearoom-value undeterminable from 
the record. However, plaintiff has operated the Tea· I 
room for 16 years. The fixtures are paid for, and his 1 
net income for 1963 was $32,344.13 (R. 139). Plaintiff's : 
ownership in Carpenter's Boat Camp and Invest· ! 
ment Enterprises is not further considered, for their 1 
respective values are not clear in the record. 
(9) How it was acquired and the efforts of each 
in doing so: Here, both parties have ~~ntinuall: 
1 
worked since their marriage in acqurrmg their 
i 
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properties and businesses. Apparently, the most suc-
cessful restaurant, Auerbach's Tearoom was ac-
quired with money earned from prior restaurants, 
namely: Russell's Cafe and Russell's Cafe No. 2. 
(10) Children reared, their present ages, and 
obligations to them or help which may in some in-
stmces be expected: None. 
(11) The present mental and physical health 
of the parties: His is good; her health, due to her 
arthritic condition, is fair. 
(12) The present age and life expectancy of 
the parties: He is 51, with a life expectancy of about 
23 years; she is 46, with a life expectancy of about 
32 years. 
(13) The happiness and pleasure, or lack of 
it, experienced during marriage: The record does 
not disclose any significant facts in this regard. 
(14) Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion, or 
care which may have been given to the spouse or 
:::ithers, s1J.ch as mother, father, etc, and obligations to 
other dependents having a secondary right to sup-
oort: This factor is not material in this case. 
( 15) The present standards of living and needs 
cf each, including the cost of living: The assets ac-
quired during the marriage furnish adequate 
sc:iurces of revenue to maintain their present stand-
ard of living, provided they are distributed between 
the parties fairly. 
12 
In considering the foregoing points with the 
record in this action, it is quite clear that an equal 
division of all real property would be fair and equit-
able. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to have 
knowledge of the value of the properties and alsc 
to have knowledge of the best use and greatest 
potential which the properties are capable 
of producing under proper management. In this 
regard the appraisal information contained in 
Exhibit D 8 is controlling, for it is the work product 
of an independent fee appraiser who is not a party 
to the action and has no prejudices in favor or 
against either party. The parties to the action ac-
quired two blocks of property on East 9th South be-
tween 5th and 7th East Streets, north of Liberty Park. 
These two blocks are prime apartment locations, and 
this is the area where the trial court was unaware 
of their true value. Plaintiff understated the value of 
these two parcels of land by $80,000.00. 
The defendant has an arthritic condition thal 
commenced with working at the parties' pastry shop 
some 15 years ago and has persisted ever since. In 
fact, Mr. McCullough, at the trial stated, "I notice 
your fingers are somewhat crippled up. Is this a 
result of your arthritic condition?" (R. 119). Defend· 
ant's arthritis not only precludes her from working 
for someone else, but it has its detrimental cosme~c 
effect which would greatly decrease defendant.s 
opportunity for remarriage. However, defendant JS 
not so incapacitated that she can't do her own work 
and the collection of rents and the rental of apar!· 
13 
ments is particularly well suited to her in light of 
her health. 
The life expectancy of defendant cannot be 
lightly regarded when she can reasonably antici-
pate 32 years of future life. These years should be 
commensurate with those she enjoyed during her 
marriage. To afford her this life, it would be neces-
sary to award her one half of the properties a.cquired 
during her marriage, taking into consideration their 
true market value. 
Defendant has been awarded alimony in the 
sum of $550.00 per month. This is an unfair amount 
in view of defendant's earning power. The record 
is clear that his income from the Auerbach's Tea-
room alone for the year 1963 was $32,344.13 (R. 139). 
It would be reasonable under the rule established, 
Bullen v. Bullen. 71 Utah 63, 262 Pac. 292 and in 
Woolley v. Woolley. 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743, that 
defendant should receive one third of plaintiff's net 
income as alimony from the Auerbach's Tearoom. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that under the facts 
of this case the trial court should have granted de-
fendant' s motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
59 (4) U.C.R.P. and that the court erred in distribut-
ing the parties' property and fixing the amount of 
~limony for defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. HUGHES 
A ttor~y for Appellant 
